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Marett Leiboff
The Good Old Rule, the Catspaw
and a Two-Headed Baby
It is not hard to think of the legal fable, or fables of the law, in the realms of the
metaphorical or the allusory, whose relationship with forms and conduct of law
might seem decidedly fabulous. Earlier in this collection, in tracing the ways in
which law might fable, I left a crumb or two behind, presaging a case which il-
lustrates just how law fables, in which fabling and the fabular feature. I now pick
up those crumbs, and bring this fabled case that is fabled and fabulous into the
realm of the legal fable, to reveal law fabled and fabular, in which the law’s
savoir faire might just be revealed as the “faire” savoir.¹ And so to fable, and
in doing so, to reveal fabulose law that is far more fabulous than might ever
be imagined.
1. A monstrous birth
In 1908, only seven years after Australia became a nation, and a short five years
after it was itself established, the High Court of Australia reached its decision
in the case of Doodeward v Spence,² that went on to become a foundational
case throughout the common law world.³ It has been used as good authority
in areas of law ranging from new technologies in medicine, to the ownership
of human remains. Before I speak much more of the case, I start by taking
you to the way the case is read through the eyes of a common lawyer, as standing
for the principle that there can be no property in a body – except if skill and la-
bour are exerted, in a classical Lockean conception of property. I have intention-
ally left out anything to explain the case, the words in italics forming the prin-
ciple that the case is said to represent, in much the same way that the moral of a
fable exists without its narrative. This theatricalization is to meant to leave you
bewildered, to enact the experience of law as bare principle in order to appreci-
ate how easily legal fabling occurs when lawyers rely on principle alone, and ig-
nore the case and its circumstances, through three entirely random, contempo-
 Marett Leiboff, “Fabulous Law: Legal Fables,” introduction to this volume.
 Doodeward v Spence ()  C.L.R. .
 Jesse Wall, Being and Owning: The Body, Bodily Material, and the Law (Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, ).
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rary examples. Firstly, a piece of scholarship. Prue Vines (correctly) makes the
point that the case is often incorrectly described as standing for principle that
there is no property in a body, that: “in fact the High Court of Australia held
that this particular baby could be regarded as property because it had been pre-
served with care and skill.”⁴ In fact, one judge said that if there had been a “law-
ful exercise of work or skill,”⁵ then the body acquires attributes that differentiate
it from a mere corpse, which would then be subject to a right of possession.⁶ But
care and skill? Not so much: “some-perhaps not much-work and skill had been
bestowed […] upon it.”⁷ Secondly a policy document. The Australian Law Reform
Commission, in a 2003 report on the protection of human genetic information,
included the following as a set of rules that are used in practice, based on the
case:⁸
Under existing law, two elements are required for a sample to become property under this
rule. First, the organisation or person using the tissue must have lawful authority to do so,
such as a hospital has in relation to tissue taken for therapeutic purposes. Second, that or-
ganisation must apply some work or skill to the preservation of the sample. If both require-
ments are satisfied, the sample may be treated as property of the organisation.⁹
This is an accurate account of the law, revealing how principles adapt to new
and different circumstances, but in this scenario, the law has been expanded
based on contemporary meanings of the words “specimen” and “body.”¹⁰ But
these are fabled, for “sample” (in the sense of a “specimen” used to test for ill-
ness, or genes and so on) was not contemplated in the case. It concerned a
corpse,¹¹ meaning any reference to a specimen related to “anatomical and patho-
logical specimens or preparations formed and maintained by scientific bodies.”¹²
And finally a set of crib notes, available for sale on the internet to law students.
 Prue Vines, “The Sacred and the Profane: The Role of Property Concepts in Disputes about
Post-mortem Examination,”  () The Sydney Law Review: –, .
 Doodeward v Spence (), .
 Doodeward v Spence (), .
 Doodeward v Spence (), –.
 Australian Law Reform Commission, Essentially Yours: The Protection of Human Genetic Infor-
mation in Australia (ALRC Report ,  May ): ., referring to Doodeward v Spence
(), .
 ALRC, Essentially Yours, .
 ALRC, Essentially Yours, .
 “body, n.”.A corpse [Perhaps originally a euphemistic shortening of “dead body”] OED On-
line. Oxford University Press, June . (last access June , ).
 Griffith C.J., Doodeward v Spence (), .
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They do not start well, referring to “M,” meaning mother. No mother was in-
volved in this case. I have underlined parts of the notes and the reason will be-
come clear presently:
M gave birth to stillborn dual headed baby. A surgeon took the body and preserved it, later
selling it at an auction. M then brought an action for recovery.
– Griffith CJ: Just because cannot own a corpse at death does not mean that it can never be
owned. A human body or portion of it is capable of becoming property; it is not neces-
sary to give an exhaustive account of the circumstances in which this is the case but
where a person has by lawful exercise of skill or work dealt with the human body so
that it is different he may own it.
– Barton J: Agreed with above but noted the gross indecency; also describes the baby as a
monster.
– Higgins J: Dissented on basis that he thought that human being cannot be owned,
whether alive or dead.¹³
The crib notes are replete with errors. But they also include a fabling of a remark
made by Barton J. He did not describe “the baby” as a monster. He instead char-
acterized “it” in law as a “dead-born fœtal monster,”¹⁴ and as such not entitled
to Christian burial. That there was ever a legal concept of monster is fabulous,¹⁵
obscured by the monster of popular culture. Monster is reframed as a description
without recourse to the legal concepts Barton J. relied upon, as is characteriza-
tion of the baby as a “thing,”¹⁶ also a legal concept of property.
If these three examples represent how the case is understood some 100 years
after it was decided, how was it understood in 1908?¹⁷ I turn to the first lines of
the headnote of the case that appears with the judgment. Headnotes, which are
written by selected lawyers, digest the key principles of a judgment, which then
end up being abstracted as the law itself:
A dead human bodymay under some circumstances become the subject of property. A corpse
may possess such peculiar attributes as to justify its preservation on scientific or other
 “Organ Donation and Tissue Research Notes Oxbridge Notes the United Kingdom, available at
http://www.oxbridgenotes.co.uk/notes/oxbridge//medical-law-notes/samples/organ-dona
tion-and-tissue-research (last access April , ).
 Barton J., Doodeward v Spence (), .
 Marett Leiboff, “Of the Monstrous Regiment and the Family Jewels,” Australian Feminist Law
Journal  (): –, –.
 Barton J., Doodeward v Spence (), .
 For techniques of reading in time see: Ann Genovese and Shaun McVeigh, “Nineteen eighty
three: A jurisographic report on Commonwealth v Tasmania,” Griffith Law Review . ():
–.
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grounds, and, if a person has by the lawful exercise of work or skill so dealt with such a
body in his lawful possession that it has acquired some attributes differentiating it from
a mere corpse awaiting burial, he acquires a right to retain possession of it […].¹⁸. (My em-
phases).
The headnote most closely represents the thinking and reasoning contained
in the majority judgment of Griffith C.J. Barton J. had “read the judgment of
the Chief Justice, and I entirely agree with the reasons it embodies, which I
hold it unnecessary to amplify.”¹⁹ And the italicized words? They barely appear
in later accounts of the case, while those underlined have been abstracted as its
principle, inevitably fabling the case and the law it is said to embody. But there is
much, much more fabling to come concerning this case, and about it.
2. A two-headed baby
It is not hard to see how cases can be divorced from their time and space, or their
founding story. The facts are a narrative of their founding story and are an impor-
tant part of the law in the case. But the facts themselves also fable. In this High
Court case, as is standard at the highest appellate level, the facts are limited to
the matters of law under consideration. Headnotes also recount the facts, briefly.
Those in the 1908 headnote are very brief:
The subject matter of the action was the corpse of a still-born two-headed child, which the
appellant had had in his possession for some years, and which had been taken from him by
the respondent, an Inspector of Police, on the occasion of a prosecution of the appellant for
exhibiting the body in public. The facts sufficiently appear in the judgments hereunder.²⁰
Griffith C.J.’s account of the facts narrates what is needed to make sense of the
legal claim, in order to establish the right of possession of the property in the
hands of Doodeward:
The subject matter of the action was the preserved body of what has been spoken of in the
case as “a two-headed baby.” It appears from the evidence that the mother of the baby gave
birth to it in New Zealand forty years ago, that it was still-born (by which I understand that
it never had an independent existence), that the mother’s medical attendant, a Dr. Dona-
 Doodeward v Spence [] N.S.W. St. Rp. , . This was replicated from the C.L.R. head-
note at .
 Barton J., Doodeward v Spence (), .
 Doodeward v Spence (), .
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hoe, who arrived after the birth, took the body away with him, preserved it with spirits in a
bottle, and kept it in his surgery as a curiosity, that at his death in 1870 it was sold by auc-
tion with his other personal effects and realized between £30 and £40, and that it after-
wards came into the possession of the appellant. It must be assumed that Dr. Donahoe’s
possession of the body was lawful, so far as the possession of such an object can be
lawful.²¹
Barton J.’s account consumed more than a page, a tirade about the “object,”
“thing,” “dead-born fœtal monster,” “curiosity,” one of “nature’s freaks,” as
an encounter with an imaginary interlocutor who is asked to form a mental pic-
ture negating any possibility that the “object” might be human:
How far would the critic consider his surprise justified or his law applicable, upon further
knowledge; upon learning what kind of “corpse” or “dead body” it is that his informant has
been describing, and how far the object when seen conforms to the mental picture he had
formed of a corpse awaiting burial? […] It has been preserved in a jar or bottle with spirits
since the day of its birth, now forty years ago. Add to these facts that it is an aberration of
nature, having two heads. Can such a thing be, without shock to the mind, associated with
the notion of the process that we know as Christian burial? Does it not almost seem inde-
cent to associate that notion with such facts?²²
These two accounts could not be further apart, but their narratives are not ran-
dom or accidental, with the Chief Justice establishing the basis under which the
possessory rights of the appellant will be established, while Barton J. wants any
later appellate court to know that he confines his reasoning to exceptional
situations.²³ It is unlikely that the facts in the dissenting judgment of Higgins J.
will be read, but if we do read his account, we read something very different,
with very different nouns and verbs in play: a baby was born, the corpse of a
still-born two-headed child, the birth took place in New Zealand in 1868; the
“medical man in attendance took the body away, and kept it in a bottle till his
death in 1870.”²⁴ He alone notes that: “The medical man in this case got posses-
sion of the corpse, and there is no evidence that the parents consented. But even
the parents could not give him any right to the corpse. It was not theirs to give.”²⁵
While Griffith C.J. accepted the legality of Dr. Donahoe’s possession, Higgins J.
questioned the fundamental basis on which the majority decision rested, and
there might have been good reason for his disquiet.
 Griffith C.J., Doodeward v Spence (), –.
 Barton J., Doodeward v Spence (), –.
 Barton J., Doodeward v Spence (), .
 Higgins J., Doodeward v Spence (), .
 Higgins J., Doodeward v Spence (), .
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3. Obnoxious exhibitions
We have to go outside the judgment to find out why. No different from La Fon-
taine’s target in his fable “The Wolf and the Lamb,”²⁶ the facts omit matters
notorious to a 1908 public. On April 6, 1884, in the then colony of New South
Wales, a Mr. Abraham Doodeward was prosecuted for exposing to public view
an indecent exhibition at a sideshow at the Bathurst Show. These shows are
held throughout Australia even now, a mix of agricultural display and funfare,
where Abraham had displayed an “obnoxious exhibition […] of the nude body
of a two-headed female infant, preserved in spirits. The defendant said he had
exhibited it for many years in Sydney and New Zealand,²⁷ making a charge for
admission, and had never been interfered with before.”²⁸ He was found guilty
by the police magistrate under the vagrants act, and sentenced to three day’s im-
prisonment (the act did not permit a “pecuniary penalty”).²⁹ Nothing more was
heard of Abraham until October 17, 1900 when “while addressing the Grand
Lodge session of Druids at the Oddfellows’ Temple [… he] fell forward and
expired.”³⁰ His tragic demise was reported throughout the Australian colonies;
a few years later, the name “Doodeward” would captivate a new Australian na-
tion for three years, all to do with the baby and its display.
In 1906, Reuben Doodeward faced his own criminal charges when he dis-
played the baby,³¹ twenty-two years after his father’s prosecution. In his appear-
ances before the magistrate and trial judge, the salacious and scandalous nature
of the evidence meant that hundreds of reports of the case appeared throughout
the country and in vast amounts of detail. The complaint on its own was enough
to whet their interest, that Reuben had “unlawfully, wickedly and scandalously
 Marett Leiboff “Fabulous Law” Introduction to this volume.
 In , an Abraham Doodeward was convicted of stealing  yards of silk from the prem-
ises of S and J.R. Vaile in New Zealand and sentenced to  years penal servitude: R v Abraham
Doodeward [] NZLostC  ( March ). It is likely this is the same Abraham Doodeward.
 “An Indecent Exhibition.” Newcastle Morning Herald and Miners’ Advocate Monday  April
: .
 “An Indecent Exhibition.”
 “NSW Sydney October : Mr. A. Doodeward,” Adelaide Observer Saturday  October :
. Adelaide in South Australia is  km from Sydney.
 “ October  at Sydney: Abraham Doodeward, husband of Betsy Doodeward, and fa-
ther of Reuben, Lewis, Hannah, Leah, Harry, Rosetta, Mabel and Albert Doodeward,” “Family
Notices: Deaths,” The Sydney Morning Herald Friday  October : .; “Mrs. Betsy Doode-
ward, relict of the late Mr. Abraham Doodeward, died on June , at her son’s residence, aged
 years,” The Hebrew Standard of Australasia Friday  June : .
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exhibited to the sight and view of persons the naked dead body of a child with
two heads.”³² No wonder the case was notorious.
Reuben Isaac Doodeward was born in 1877. Some newspaper reports said he
was a young man, but he was nearly thirty at the time of the proceedings. He
would have been nearly ten at the time of his father’s prosecution, but the evi-
dence in the committal and criminal trial revealed some odd and startling incon-
sistencies. This 1906 prosecution was triggered by the display of the baby at the
Sydney Cricket Ground, during a public schools’ sports carnival. In the tradition
of the travelling show, the baby was displayed in a tent, and people were tempt-
ed to enter the tent through the inducements of a tout, and a placard showing
the baby. There were two moral panics on display: Reuben was inducing children
away from a healthy activity, sport, and the effect of the display on children. The
children happily lined up oblivious to their moral welfare, paying a penny to
enter the tent.³³
We have to remember that until the early 1970s, one only became an adult at
twenty one; a twenty-year old was a child in law, as were young children. A po-
lice officer entered the tent and saw a body of a child suspended by the arms by
means of a tape in some liquid in a glass case. He said to Reuben: “This is a very
improper show to have here on the occasion of children’s sports, and if you con-
tinue to exhibit it probably proceedings – will be taken against you.”³⁴ He asked
Reuben where he got it: “My father bought it in New Zealand from a doctor 20
years ago. He made a living out of it, and I intend to do the same.”³⁵ In the com-
mittal proceedings, Reuben was pressed on these dates by the magistrate hear-
ing the committal, Mr Macfarlane. The timeframes had shifted. Reuben now said
that he had known it to be exhibited for a number of years in Bathurst, about
twenty-three years before. The magistrate said: “Do you state that of your own
knowledge? Reuben replied: “Well, not exactly of my own knowledge, but my fa-
ther exhibited it in Bathurst. There was never any objection raised to my exhib-
iting it before the present case.”³⁶ One of his brothers supported Reuben’s
statements.³⁷ The Bathurst newspaper that had reported on Abraham’s prosecu-
tion was not going to let this stand, adding this to their report:
 “The Two-Headed Baby: Doodeward Bound Over, Sydney, Thursday,” National Advocate
Bathurst, Friday  November : .
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It might be stated that in April, 1884, a man named Abraham Doodeward was proceeded
against by Sub Inspector Morris the Bathurst Police Court on a charge of exhibiting an in-
decent representation. The offence consisted of exhibiting in a tent on Bathurst Show-
ground a two-headed baby enclosed in a jar, and Doodeward was sentenced to three
days’ imprisonment³⁸
There were other discrepancies. Dr. Paton, the Government medical officer, stat-
ed that the body was that of a male (not a female) child which: “Had evidently
been kept in spirit for many, probably 20 years.”³⁹ But by the time the civil case
commenced in the New South Wales courts in 1907, the Doodeward’s possession
had doubled. A narrative based in science was also starting to take hold, with
Reuben remarking: “I have heard people say that it was well worth looking at.
In hearing children speaking of it I noticed that not one believed it was a
child at all. One child passed the remark that it was made of putty.”⁴⁰
Reuben was committed but at the trial changed his not guilty plea almost
immediately, and was bound over to appear for sentence if called upon, trigger-
ing the civil proceedings. Dr. Paton suggested that the baby should be handed to
the Museum, and Sub-Inspector Spence agreed and took possession of it. Reu-
ben objected to both courses of action, and then applied for the baby’s return,
but Spence refused to return it without instructions. The baby was temporarily
placed in the museum at Sydney University, and Reuben immediately took pro-
ceedings “with a view to recovering the monstrosity.”⁴¹ The civil case that ended
up in the High Court began on June, 20, 1907 as an action against Spence in con-
version and detinue; it was Spence in name only, for the case was proceeding
under the auspices of the state Attorney-General. The statement of claim de-
manded the return of “a certain jar, containing a certain amount of chemical
fluid, as a scientific exhibit, representing a baby with two heads,” and damages
of £400 in the District Court,⁴² where Rogers, D.C.J., non-suited him on the basis
that there could be no property in a body. The case was appealed immediately to
the New South Wales Supreme Court, but was dismissed on November 7, 1907. No
facts were recorded in any of the three judgments. The only facts appeared in the




 “Doodeward Bound Over.”
 Doodeward v Spence ()  S.R. (N.S.W.) , ; “Two-Head Baby. Action for Detention”
Singleton Argus, Thursday  June : .
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headnote in the defence’s argument, which more or less are followed by
Griffith C.J.⁴³
We also find something else in the New South Wales report: “Appeal dis-
missed with costs up to the time of the appellant being allowed to proceed in
forma pauperis.”⁴⁴ Reuben was indigent and had costs waived.⁴⁵ Without the
baby, he inevitably was unable to earn an income.⁴⁶ He was granted leave to
appeal to the High Court on 20 December 1907; in January 1908: “The Chief Jus-
tice regarded the application as being in forma pauperis, and reduced the secur-
ity for costs to £1.”⁴⁷ The appeal was heard in May 1908, and the judgment de-
livered on July 31, 1908. It was allowed with costs and remitted to the District
Court for trial. That seemed to be the end of it, but in September 1908 questions
were asked of the Attorney-General in the New South Wales Parliament: “Is it a
fact that the Crown is appealing from the decision of the High Court of Australia
to the Privy Council and, if so, what will be the probable cost of such appeal? Of
what particular value, if any, is Doodeward’s two-headed baby to the State of
New South Wales?”⁴⁸ The state did appeal to the Judicial Committee of the
Privy Council, the final appellate court for Australia until the 1980s. It was
based in London and was effectively a version of the House of Lords, but Grif-
fith C.J. and Barton J. were also members. In December 1908, it refused special
leave to appeal in Spence v Doodeward.⁴⁹
This decision also meant that the remitted District Court decision stood. In
November 1908,⁵⁰ a month before the Privy Council decision, Reuben again
sought damages or the return of the baby. New South Wales persisted. No law
required the return of a corpse, the object had no scientific value, the duty to
bury the child now fell on the person in whose possession it happened to be,
Spence. Judge Docker held that as the specimen was the subject of an appeal
 Doodeward v Spence (), .
 Doodeward v Spence (), .
 The losing side has to pay the costs the other side incurred in running the case. Not all costs
are paid.
 His name appears in connection with completely different business ventures from inventing
badges to advertising.
 “The Two-Headed Baby High Court Application Reduction of Security Allowed,” The Sydney
Morning Herald, Friday  January : . A payment into court to cover any potential costs
awards against the appellant.
 “The Two-Headed Baby,” Evening News, Sydney,Wednesday  September : .
 “Two-Headed Baby. Right of Possession Upheld By Privy Council London Dec .” The
Argus, Melbourne Thursday  December : .
 “Two-Headed Baby Again. Return or £  s Damages Awarded.” The Sydney Morning Her-
ald, Friday  November : .
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to the Privy Council, the Crown should agree to a verdict against it, subject to a
stay until the Privy Council decision. It did not accept this. Regardless, Docker J.
applied the law in the High Court decision and awarded damages. He rejected a
quantum of £37, the price paid forty years earlier, and a value based on its po-
tential exhibition value of £137. Professor Welsh of Sydney University valued it at
about £2. His Honor instead “fixed a liberal amount, £10 10s.” The Crown de-
murred. “His Honor: You want time to pay the judgment? Mr. Piddington: No;
we want time to know whether we ought to pay the judgment.” The stay was
granted for a fortnight. ⁵¹ It seems as if Reuben took the money even though it
was a lot less than the £400 he wanted. That was the last time the baby was
heard of in the newspapers, at least in connection with Reuben Doodeward.
4. Fabulous Judges
Most lawyers would have no idea about these postscripts to the High Court de-
cision. That these oddities are lost is a measure of the fabling of law that occurs
over time. There is more to be come about the High Court decision, but the Jus-
tices and their judging practices are also fabled by lawyers who imagine these
founding justices of the High Court to be black-letter lawyers who draw on noth-
ing but narrow forms of legal reasoning when reaching their decisions. In 1910,
a wag calling himself “A Barrister” wrote a scandalous piece that rather scup-
pers this image:
The High Court does love to utter strange axioms, apothegms, dark sayings up on the harp,
and the reports are studded with such … plums in a dough of Law. Consider some precios-
ities, drawn at random […]. Nor is the tribunal destitute of humor, of the “big wow wow”
order, as when it (3) observed in the classic Two Headed Baby case: “If the plaintiff is en-
titled to recover possession of this corpse, there is nothing to hinder anyone from snatching
the corpse of some eminent man, such as Napoleon, and keeping it in a bottle, or using it
for degrading purposes. As Hamlet says, “Why may not imagination trace the noble dust of
Alexander till he find it stopping a bung-hole.’” The Court will not stop at Shakespere [sic],
is indeed (4) amorous of the classics […] when Griffith, C.J., makes his lambent sword play
with learning’s tools it is (5) nothing unusual for the great Queenslander (discussing what
“lawful possession” is) to quote with gusto such ancient piffle as —
“The good old rule, the simple plan,
That he should take who has the power,
And he should keep, who can.” (— Doodeward v. Spence.)⁵²
 “Return or £  s Damages Awarded.”
 “The Law and the Profits. Notes On Mercantile And General Legalities. Specially written for
the “Evening News” by A Barrister,” Evening News, Sydney, Tuesday  April : .
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If there is any image had of Sir Samuel Griffith G.C.M.G., Q.C., the founding Chief
Justice of the High Court who served between 1903– 1919, it is not that of some-
one fond of “piffle”. Born in Wales, he came to Australia in 1853 as a nine year
old, settling in Queensland. He was dux of his school, and at the University of
Sydney (the University of Queensland only opened in 1910), he was awarded a
B.A. with first-class honours in classics, mathematics and natural science in
1863.⁵³ In 1862 he won the Cooper scholarship in classics (assessed as one of
the four best students of his decade), and the Barker scholarship in mathemat-
ics. He also took general jurisprudence. In 1865, he was awarded a Travelling Fel-
lowship, spending some of his time in Italy, later translating The Inferno of Dante
Alighieri, published in 1908, the same year this case was decided. He returned to
Brisbane where he became a solicitor and then barrister, before entering politics,
including periods as Attorney-General and Premier of Queensland, before be-
coming Chief Justice from 1893 until his appointment to the High Court. Appoint-
ed to the Privy Council in 1901, he drafted the legislation inaugurating the High
Court of Australia. Griffith died in 1920.⁵⁴
He might have been on the harp, but Sir Edmond Barton (1849– 1920) the
first Prime Minister of Australia, resigned to become one of the three founding
High Court Justices. He remained on the bench until his death. A colonial poli-
tician, he was also New South Wales Attorney-General. Sydney-born, Barton was
a brilliant student, winning the £50 Lithgow scholarship and the Cooper scholar-
ship. He graduated B.A. in 1868, and was a solicitor before being admitted to the
Bar in 1871. He was appointed to the Privy Councillor in 1901.⁵⁵ One thing may
not be immediately apparent. Neither of these men had law degrees. Both under-
took their law studies through articles of clerkship, because law was not taught
at universities at the time. Articles were an apprenticeship and exams sat on set
areas of law as approved by the courts. The University of Sydney Law School
opened in 1859 to undertake these examinations; it only began teaching law thir-
ty years later.⁵⁶ Articles were the only option in Queensland. The University of
 Sir Samuel W Griffith GCMG., BA (Hons), MA., Hon LL.D (Qld)., Hon LL.D (Wales)., QC avail-
able at http://www.sclqld.org.au/judicial-papers/judicial-profiles/profiles/swgriffith (last access
July , ).
 R. B. Joyce, “Griffith, Sir Samuel Walker (–),” Australian Dictionary of Biography
Vol. , (MUP), . available at http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/griffith-sir-samuel-walker-
 (last access July , ).
 Martha Rutledge, “Barton, Sir Edmund (Toby) (–)” Australian Dictionary of Biog-
raphy Vol. , (MUP), . Available at http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/barton-sir-edmund-
toby- (last access July , ).
 Sydney Law School: History. Available at http://sydney.edu.au/law/about/history.shtml (last
access July , ).
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Melbourne opened Australia’s first law school in 1857. By 1872, completing part
of its law course was compulsory for new lawyers.⁵⁷
Higgins J. was one of these new lawyers, and it was his words from the so-
called Two Headed Baby case that “A Barrister” quoted at length at (3). Born in
Ireland in 1851, Higgins arrived in Victoria in 1870, obtaining a common schools
teacher’s certificate and supporting himself tutoring the children of the Mel-
bourne elite. He had been schooled in Ireland in the classics, and at the Univer-
sity of Melbourne “had an outstanding record […] in languages, logic, history,
political economy and in Shakespeare.”⁵⁸ Awarded his LL.B. in 1874, he was ad-
mitted to the Victorian Bar in 1876. Also a colonial politician, he served in both
the Victorian colonial and the new Commonwealth Parliaments. Left-wing and
progressive, he became Federal Attorney-General in 1904, and was appointed
to the High Court in 1906. Higgins died in 1929 while still a serving Justice of
the High Court.⁵⁹
None of these brief pen portraits can do justice to any of these men, but one
thing stands out: all three were schooled in the humanities before studying law.
They shared a greater or lesser expertise in the classics, and with Griffith’s math-
ematics and natural science, and languages, and Higgins’ logic, history and pol-
itics, languages and literature, they inevitably share foundational concepts and
ideas, key texts and concepts. It is also hard to imagine that were not affected in
some way by the 1662 Logic of Port-Royal,⁶⁰ for its influence remained wide-
spread until the end of the nineteenth century, appearing in ten English editions,
with the 1818 edition serving as a text at Cambridge and Oxford.⁶¹ A popular 1850
translation by T.S. Baynes, Logic, or, The art of thinking: being the Port-Royal
Logic,⁶² was written with students in mind and found its way to the colonies,
turning up in the list of items auctioned when a Mr. Johnson’s library of philos-
ophy, theology and politics was put on sale in 1869 in advance of his return to
 Melbourne Law School: Beginnings. Available at http://www.law.unimelb.edu.au/mel
bourne-law-school/community/history/beginnings (last access July , ).
 John Rickard, “Higgins, Henry Bournes (–)”Australian Dictionary of Biography
Vol. , (MUP),  Available at http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/higgins-henry-bournes-
 (last access July , ).
 “Higgins, Henry Bournes (–)”
 Marett Leiboff “Fabulous Law”. Introduction to this volume.
 Buroker, Jill, “Port Royal Logic,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall  Edi-
tion), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall/entries/port-
royal-logic/>. (Last access April , ).
 Antoine Arnauld and Pierre Nicole, Logic, or, The art of thinking: being the Port-Royal logic,
trans. Thomas Spencer Baynes (Edinburgh: Sutherland and Knox, ).
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England.⁶³ Higgins, who studied logic, must have known of its methods, and its
pervasive influence meant that Griffith and Barton could not have avoided its in-
fluence. Though couched in formal legal method, the judgments of Griffith C.J.
and Higgins J. recall the Logic as coded through Marin’s reading of “The Wolf
and The Lamb,”⁶⁴ and through their invocation of fables and their morality, we
will see that through their reasoning, each evokes the reason of the strongest
and the logic of the weak,⁶⁵ with inevitable results.
5. Fabling: The reason of the strongest
is always best, redux
A few short hours after the High Court delivered its judgment in Doodeward v
Spence, Sydney’s Evening News adorned its report with this headline: “The
Two Headed Baby. Supreme Court Judgment Upset. A ‘Twentieth Century
Case.’ The Mummy, The Skeleton and The Skull.”⁶⁶ Its author was able to speed-
ily find the nub of each of the Chief Justice’s and Higgins’. judgments, represent-
ed in the headline. The headline is uncanny, cleverly speaking to each judgment,
but once we read the judgments themselves, we find that something else is going
on, that their reasoning represents the grammatical and discursive devices, as
accounted for in the earlier chapter in this collection, that Marin attributes to
La Fontaine’s wolf (the Chief Justice) and lamb (Higgins J).⁶⁷
First to the Chief Justice. It is without question that the “great Queenslander”
is a force of nature and a powerful figure. Once we start reading the Chief Justi-
ce’s judgment, we realize just how his power is made manifest, and that is
through the force of his reason and logic. We are captivated and captured, ac-
cepting its inerrancy however much we might want to demur. From the moment
he observes that “it does not follow from the mere fact that a human body at
death is not the subject of ownership that it is forever incapable of having an
 Listed at lot number : The Sydney Morning Herald Friday  February : .
 Leiboff, “Fabulous Law.”
 Edwin Patterson, “Logic in the Law,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review  (): –
. He observes that lawyers and judges intuitively draw on “straight thinking” as formal logic:
“The older treatises on logic, such as the “Port Royal Logic” of  regarded logic as “the art of
properly conducting one’s reason in the knowledge of things,” that is, the art of straight think-
ing” (citation omitted):; concluding that “The lawyer and the judge can, and ordinarily do,
reason in a way consistent with the rules of formal logic, without knowing those rules…” .
 Evening News, (Sydney), (July , ), .
 Leiboff, “Fabulous Law.”
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owner,”⁶⁸ we are left in doubt that we must accept whatever comes next. We
quickly realize that the reason of the strongest is always best in order to vouch-
safe the pre-eminence of rights of property in law. The small matter of the author-
ities or case law that might stand against this position is swiftly dispensed with,
on grounds no less than their fabulousness:
Many doctrines have been asserted on the supposed authority of learned persons […] I do
not, myself, accept the dogma of the verbal inerrancy of ancient text writers. Indeed, equal-
ly respectable authority, and of equal antiquity, may be cited for establishing as a matter of
law the reality of witchcraft. But in my opinion none of the authorities cited afford any as-
sistance in the present case. We are, therefore, free to regard it as a case of first instance
arising in the 20th century, and to decide it in accordance with general principles of law,
which are usually in accord with reason and common sense.⁶⁹
This is a breath-taking device. To cast this as a case of first instance in the twen-
tieth century is a stunning manoeuvre, its reason and logic the “faire” savoir of
the wolf,⁷⁰ a violent discursive act dispensing with the law to make law, under-
scored by the little verse that A Barrister thought was “piffle”.⁷¹ I will return to
the verse presently. Griffith C.J. had to swiftly dispense with the possibility that
the possession of the baby was unlawful, or at least questionable, doing so by
speaking of possession that “is not necessarily unlawful” that shifts immediately
to “possession which is lawful.”⁷² The grammatical trick is stunning, for it
grounds a claim to the baby that is based in lawful possession. Such possession
“connotes a right to invoke the law for its protection. A lawful possession which
does not invoke any right cognizable by law is a contradiction in terms. Other-
wise there would be a field of English law where still prevails: “The good old
rule […].”⁷³ Three uncited lines of poetry underscore and ground principles in-
voked beyond the limits of the law, from beyond the law, and as we will soon
see, they have been purloined and verballed, for they mean something different
entirely.
Another masterful stroke, for Griffith C.J. has somehow managed to convince
us that Reuben’s rights have been violated, regardless of how he and his father
acquired the baby – or, indeed, how the doctor acquired it. Reuben is now cast
as the victim, the lamb, against the wolf of the Crown, which seeks to acquire
 Doodeward v Spence (), .
 Doodeward v Spence (), .
 Leiboff, “Fabulous Law.”
 Doodeward v Spence (), .
 Doodeward v Spence (), .
 Doodeward v Spence (), .
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property through the naked power and without any lawful basis through the
terms of “the good old rule,” in terms no different to that which characterized
law under the ancien régime targeted by La Fontaine.⁷⁴ That the Chief Justice
is doing precisely the same thing is obscured by through the grammatical vio-
lence deployed. He knows there is something not quite right about the character
of the possession, but he is determined to establish a principle based in property
nonetheless.
Surprisingly, his motives are grounded in the discursive ethics of his new
society, and with an eye towards collections of scientific knowledge and the in-
formation they contain:⁷⁵ “If one medical or scientific student may lawfully pos-
sess it, he may transfer the possession to another. Nor can the right of possession
be limited to students.”⁷⁶ Ergo, Reuben is not a student, but he too can have the
same right of possession. Griffith C.J., though remembered as a conservative, was
the champion of the worker when young. Even Reuben is able to hold property in
the twentieth century in this new country. The concerns of the fabulists of old –
Henryson and La Fontaine – are now remedied.⁷⁷ The reasoning is triumphantly
egalitarian and diabolical in one for Griffith C.J. has established these rights on
fabulous grounds.
It is incongruous, then, that a carefully crafted general principle he included
in the judgment has itself been fabled by later generations of lawyers, extending
the principle to living bodies when he had carefully limited his judgment to bod-
ies from which life had been extinguished:
A human body or a portion of a human body, is capable by law of becoming the subject of
property […] I entertain no doubt that, when a person has by the lawful exercise of work or
skill so dealt with a human body or part of a human body in his lawful possession that it
has acquired some attributes differentiating it from a mere corpse awaiting burial, he ac-
quires a right to retain possession of it, at least as against any person not entitled to
have it delivered to him for the purpose of burial.⁷⁸
The latter part of the Evening News’ headline is pure schlock-horror, picking up
the examples that Higgins J. used: the legal status of a mummy, skeletons and, of
course,Yorick that A Barrister gleefully picked up on in 1910. Higgins J. is looking
backwards in time, as represented by this memento mori, as well as forward in
this judgment. It echoes and responds to Chief Justice through logic and law. But
 Leiboff, “Fabulous Law.”
 Doodeward v Spence (), .
 Doodeward v Spence (), .
 Leiboff, “Fabulous Law.”
 Doodeward v Spence (), .
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as we know, wolves eat lambs.⁷⁹ Higgins’ J. invokes culture and civil society, the
lamb of Marin’s reading of the fable, when he speaks of a baby and questions the
lawful basis under which it was taken in the first place, and through the close
reading and detailed account of the law, recounting all the principles including
the ecclesiastical law dealing with the burial of two-headed babies, and author-
ities from the US.⁸⁰ He has not fabled the law to reach his conclusion, unlike the
Chief Justice, but his resort to logic and reason will get him nowhere, as we know
from La Fontaine.⁸¹ He is concerned about the consequences that will flow from
any decision to allow property in a corpse, a two-headed baby today, Napoleon
tomorrow. But there is something else. A Barrister left out something else Higgins
J. said [my emphases]:
But even more—according to the plaintiff—if some one else take away the corpse, the first
snatcher must be assisted by British law to recover it. The Court is to be used as a catspaw
by a body snatcher. The law is invoked, not only to recognize the right to snatch a corpse,
under the “good old rule,” but is asked to enforce the return of the body to the snatcher
when he has not been able to keep it.⁸²
This call to and echo of the Chief Justice’s use of “the good old rule” points us
towards two things: that the Chief Justice has been selective in his use of the
verse, and that he has himself, with Barton’s J. aid, invoked the good old rule
himself. The other emphasised words tell us precisely what he thinks about
their actions. Both are fabulous, as we will now see.
6. The good old rule: the reason
of the strongest is always best
In 1887, an illustrated article appeared in the Australian Town and Country
Journal.⁸³ The Journal, a weekly English language broadsheet was published
out of Sydney from 1870 until its demise in 1919.⁸⁴ It was founded by Samuel
Bennett to be
 Leiboff, “Fabulous Law.”
 Doodeward v Spence (), –.
 Leiboff, “Fabulous Law.”
 Doodeward v Spence (), –.
 Australian Town and Country Journal, (Sydney), (August , ), 
 “Australian Town and Country Journal” in The Oxford Companion to Australian Literature
( ed.), eds. William H.Wilde, Joy Hooton, and Barry Andrews, http://www.oxfordreference.
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“valuable to everybody for its great amount of useful and reliable information”, it dealt very
thoroughly with diverse subjects: in addition to the customary domestic and foreign news,
it included weekly essays on literature, science and invention. The “country” aspect of the
journal was strongly emphasized in parliamentary reports and commercial news, with es-
says on all phases of agriculture, articles on rural towns for the edification of city dwellers,
and weekly reports from correspondents scattered throughout the colony. ⁸⁵
Samuel Bennett died in 1878, but even after his death, the Journal continued
his “deep and lively interest in both history and literature, subjects on which
he wrote many essays and reviews in his early years”,⁸⁶ as a key publication
in which Australian writers could be published.⁸⁷ Bryce notes that this was his
best known publication and its “breadth and thoroughness which made it
well respected in his time and later a valuable source for the study of Australian
social history”.⁸⁸ He was also the publisher of the somewhat differently coloured
Evening News, of which the Journal was a companion publication.⁸⁹ A.B. or
“Banjo” Paterson had been the editor of the Evening News (1904–06), and
then took over as the editor of the Journal (1907–8). Banjo Paterson might not
mean anything to people outside Australia. He wrote the poem that became Aus-
tralia’s unofficial national anthem, “Waltzing Matilda”, and created the image of
the mythical Australian horseman in “The Man from Snowy River”. He was also
impeccably connected. A relative of Barton, A.B. Paterson was also a solicitor.⁹⁰
These webs of connection reveal everything as they do nothing. The swirling cap-
ital of shared discursive dispositions meant that the “good old rule” that re-
mained uncited in these judgments did not need to be, because they were
well-known in late colonial Australia. There was no need, just as La Fontaine
com/view/./acref/../acref--e-, (last access
November , ).
 Merilyn J. Bryce, “Bennett, Samuel (–)”, Australian Dictionary of Biography, Na-
tional Centre of Biography, Australian National University, http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/
bennett-samuel-/text, published first in hardcopy , accessed online  Novem-
ber .
 “Samuel Bennett”
 “Australian Town and Country Journal”
 “Samuel Bennett”
 “Australian Town and Country Journal”;The Evening News ran from  July – March
.
 Clement Semmler, “Paterson, Andrew Barton (Banjo) (–)”, Australian Dictionary
of Biography, National Centre of Biography, Australian National University, http://adb.anu.edu.
au/biography/paterson-andrew-barton-banjo-/text, published first in hardcopy
, (last access December , ).
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did not need to point to the subject of his attention in in “The Wolf and the
Lamb.”⁹¹
For the article in the Journal is our clue to the “good old rule”. These words
do not need to be explained within the world of late colonial, early Federation
Australia. But they mean nothing to those of us born out of time, without the
benefit of this circulating shared capital that meant there seemed to be no
need for any explanation or reference of these words as they appear in the judg-
ment. They are left unnamed in the judgment, one a call (in the Chief Justice’s
judgment), and an echo (in that of Higgins’ J).They need to be decoded and ex-
plained because there is nothing that tells us to what they refer. To cut to the
chase: these are lines from an 1807 Wordsworth poem, “Rob Roy’s Grave”,
and they point to the key site of dispute in the judgments of the Chief Justice
and the dissenting Higgins J.
Though traceable to the Wordsworth poem, however, the reference in the
judgment is not identical with the poem itself, however. If you look at the illus-
trated article in which they appear in the Journal, you might notice three num-
bered points. They comprise the form of words the Chief Justice used that A Bar-
rister called “ancient piffle,” and each appends to the “moving image” of the
“storyboard” of the illustrations accompanying the little article (Fig. 1).
The passage from the poem included in the piece in the Journal is cushioned
by a modern, illustrated fable, complete with animals, for Wordsworth was
describing animal behaviour; eagles in the air and Rob Roy on the ground.
But this is far from being the poem’s moral. Rob Roy MacGregor (1671– 1734)
was both outlaw and political hero, a Highlander who demanded protection
money from Lowlanders, a Jacobite rebel who helped poor tenant farmers
against oppressive landowners.⁹² His legend was fanned by early nineteenth-
century Romantics as a champion of liberty against might, justice against law
as an agent of division in society, and rights of property as a tool of injustice.⁹³
It is a mistake to read the poem as negating law in favour of unbridled power, for
through the figure of Rob Roy,Wordsworth has crafted a version of the “The Wolf
and The Lamb” invoking the sentiments of that much earlier Scot, Henryson:⁹⁴
 Leiboff, “Fabulous Law.”
 Rob Roy (–) http://www.scotlandspeople.gov.uk/content/help/index.aspx?,
(last access June , ).
 Adam Potkay, Wordsworth’s Ethics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press ), –
.
 Leiboff, “Fabulous Law.”
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For thou wert still the poor man’s stay,
The poor man’s heart, the poor man’s hand!
And all the oppressed who wanted strength
Had thine at their command.
Fig. 1: ‘The Good Old Rule’, Australian Town
and Country Journal 1887.
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But now look at Wordsworth’s actual verse. It is less attenuated than the
stripped down words found in these numbered points in the Journal; that is
the words that have been used in the judgment. The Chief Justice has fabled the
100 year old poem, perhaps even extracting the modifications from the magazine
itself, accepting them at face value as literally advocating power absent law, that
is, “might is right,” or “the reason of the strongest is best.” A fable fabled, based
on the three lines of imperfectly extracted principle, a principle without the
text that goes with it. But in its brevity, Higgins’ J. retort hints at something
more, and we see it through the next line: the catspaw. Another fable, and
again, it is one of La Fontaine’s: “The Monkey and the Cat” (1679). Bertrand
the monkey gets Raton the cat to pull roasted chestnuts from a fire, and promises
that he will give him some. Raton burns his paw taking them out of the fire, and
Bertrand dupes him, eating all of them. Thus, the French saying tirer les marrons
du feu, “pull the chestnuts from the fire” [my translation]; a catspaw is some-
one’s dupe, doing someone’s dirty work for their benefit. ⁹⁵ The catspaw (and
its variant, the cat’s foot), have circulated in English since the seventeenth cen-
tury. Higgins J. was making his meaning amply clear – through yet another fable.
A final trap. None of the judges or A Barrister cited the origin of the verse or
fable. The words float free. In a study I conducted in 2010,⁹⁶ I asked lawyers of
different age groups to explain what Higgins J. meant by catspaw, body snatcher,
and good old rule. The meaning might have been perfectly clear in 1908, but
twenty-first-century lawyers, whose training in the humanities has diminished,
and who do not look for anything but law in law and for whom law is rules
and doctrine,⁹⁷ looked for the two lines of principle that were not there. In
their absence, they created some, fabling instead, as we see in this table:
 “cat’s ‘paw;’cat’s-paw, n.” OED Online.Oxford University Press, April .Web. (Last access
April , ): eg.  These he useth as the Monkey did the Cats paw, to scrape the nuts out
of the fire;  Bothwell was merely the cat’s-paw of Murray, Morton, and Maitland.  I am
not going to be made a cat’s paw of. Making themselves mere catspaws to secure chestnuts
for those publishers
 Talkin’ “bout law”s generations: an empirical and jurisprudential investigation into the reading
of legal cases by different generations of lawyers, funded by a University of Wollongong University
Research Committee Small Grant ,University of Wollongong Human Research Ethics Appro-
val HE/,  June , as extended. See generally, Marett Leiboff, “‘Ditto’: Law, Pop Cul-
ture and Humanities and the Impact of Intergenerational Interpretative Dissonance,” Australian
Feminist Law Journal  (): –.
 Peter Goodrich, “The New Casuistry,” Critical Inquiry  (): –; Marett Leiboff
“Ghosts of Law and Humanities (Past, Present, Future),”  () Australian Feminist Law Jour-
nal: –.
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. Catspaw Dupe / Naïve Agent .    .
Agent  . .  .
Other/not answered . . .  .
. Body
snatcher
Correct . . .  .
Other/not answered . . .  .
. Good old
rule
Correct     
No property in body . . .  
Possession is /ths
of law
 .   
Finders Keepers  . .  
Precedent, property
law
. . .  .
Other/not answered . . .  .
Participants were given no clues. Body snatcher, a word in contemporary usage
and with a legal meaning was capable of being coded generally, but not catspaw
and the good old rule. To imagine catspaw as an agent, is to insert a formal
legal concept into Higgins’ J. reasoning. An agent is authorized to act in the
stead of another without their actual authority, a positive concept. The meaning
is changed utterly. Good old rule became a rule of property law and its associated
rights of possession. Not one participant knew that this was a quote from a poem,
the lawyer-participants insisting on finding a legal meaning where there was
none. It reveals how lawyers invest meaning, impose law, and do injustice to
the meaning of a case, through a form of conduct that invokes power without
knowledge as “faire” savoir, making like knowledge. And this is precisely what
happened to catspaw.
In a 2011 US Supreme Court decision, legal readers were again mystified by a
‘new’ legal term, catspaw, though if the lawyers had read the judgment, they
would have found the answer they were looking for in a very detailed footnote.
A legal blogger came to the rescue:⁹⁸
We have done some homework and offer the following insights into this relatively new legal
phrase. The Supreme Court itself must have been aware of the fact [and …] in the first foot-
note in Staub, offered this explanation: “cat’s paw” derives from a fable conceived by
 Staub v. Proctor Hospital  U.S. ; John Kalter, “The Origin of the Cat’s Paw,” All in a
Day’s Work®. Available at http://godfreykahnlawblogs.com////the-origin-of-the-cats-
paw/ (last access September , ).
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Aesop, put into verse by La Fontaine in 1679, and injected into United States employment
discrimination law by Posner in 1990 […].
The catspaw doctrine in US law wasn’t new, created by Posner J. That one of the
nemeses of law and literature had drawn on a literary term to shape a legal con-
cept is perhaps surprizing, and a year later, Posner J. had enough of his catspaw:
This is all a dreadful muddle, for which we appellate judges must accept some blame be-
cause doctrine stated as metaphor, such as the “cat’s paw” theory of liability […] Spann was
no one’s cat’s paw; he was the monkey […] with his own paws rather than enlisting some
hapless cat to do so.⁹⁹
This was no accidental “dreadful muddle.” It is a joke about a lawyer who gets
things wrong, literally, in Robert Louis Stevenson’s and Lloyd Osbourne’s 1889
black comedy The Wrong Box: “Next thing, you’ll ask me to help you out of
the muddle. I know I’m emissary of Providence, but not that kind! You get out
of it yourself, like Æsop and the other fellow. Must be [a] dreadful muddle […].”
Stevenson, a Scots contemporary of the Doodeward v Spence High Court judges,
is famous as the author of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde, and this little trap of Posner’s
takes us, again, for fable, to force us into a realization that we as lawyers make
fabulous errors based in fable or fiction, through and in the law itself.
 Cook v. IPC International Corp.,  F.d  (th Cir.) .
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